Whether the soul is a body?
It would seem that the soul is a body.
For the soul is the moving principle of the body.
Nor does it move unless moved.
First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat.
Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul.
Therefore the soul is a mover moved.
But every mover moved is a body.
Therefore the soul is a body.
Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness.
But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing.
If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things.
Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact.
But contact is only between bodies.
Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.
On the contrary,
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk."
I answer that,
To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things "animate," [* i. e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate."
Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement.
The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal.
This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.
It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul.
Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life.
For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life.
Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body.
Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act.
Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.
Reply to Objection 1:
As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved.
For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act.
But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement.
There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul.
There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially -- namely, the body.
And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.
Reply to Objection 2:
The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially.
Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness.
But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.
Reply to Objection 3:
There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power."
By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.